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Introduction
In the past few years, the Chinese leadership and Chinese legal scholars
have become increasingly vocal about the need to establish original “Chi-
nese” approaches to jurisprudence, legal theory, and legal thought. In May
2016, Xi Jinping himself met with Chinese social scientists and legal scholars,
urging them to develop “original theories based on China’s practical condi-
tions.” (1) In the meeting, a representative from the legal field agreed that
the “legal profession should strengthen its theoretical self-confidence by
setting off from China’s realities in order to examine and solve today’s major
theoretical and practical problems.” (2) Efforts to indigenise Chinese jurispru-
dence have influenced the allocation of government research grants. (3) In
addition to state-sponsored attempts to develop indigenised forms of ju-
risprudence, a number of prominent Chinese legal scholars—especially
those associated with the “New Left” and neo-conservativism—have pro-
moted indigenised legal theories under various rubrics, such as sociological
jurisprudence (Jiang 2010; Zhu 2001) and New Confucianism (Xia 2011).
What precisely needs to be indigenised, if anything at all, is a matter of
debate (Wang 2016; Xu 2016). Generally, calls for a Chinese “jurisprudence”
(falixue 法理学) have pertained to theoretical and methodological matters,
such as questions about the nature of law and legal research methods, as
well as to theories of adjudication, which explain how judges decide dis-
putes (Wang 2016). The term “legal theory” (faxue lilun 法学理论) is used
synonymously with “jurisprudence” (Xu 2016), and with reference to both
Western legal theory and ideologically loaded, theoretical descriptions of
China’s socialist legal system. (4) The term “legal thought” (falü sixiang 法律
思想) refers not only to scholarly jurisprudence but also to existing modes
of legal reasoning in the legal profession, which may or may not be theorised
on the high level of academic jurisprudence (Deng 2008).
While there is much ambiguity about the precise objectives of these re-
forms, certain common features stand out in the attempts to develop indi-
genised forms of Chinese jurisprudence. These attempts are sometimes
animated by an anti-formalist ethos. Anti-formalism effectively stands for
the contention that legal thought in general, and theories of adjudication
in particular, should be more responsive to social needs than what the mere
application of formal law allows (Zhu 2016: 123). The anti-formalist sensi-
bility is supported by the Chinese leadership’s campaign against “formalism”
as one of the “four forms of decadence,” along with bureaucratism, hedo-
nism, and extravagance. Formalism, in Xi Jinping’s words, “means doing
things for form’s sake—the separation of action from knowledge, neglecting
what is truly effective, hiding behind piles of documents and immersing
oneself in meetings, the pursuit of vanity and a resort to falsehood.” (5) Al-
though Xi Jinping’s comments were not made with direct reference to law,
they have been cited by Party ideologues as an argument for increasing
pragmatism in law enforcement. (6) The anti-formalist sensibility also fits
China’s self-consciously pragmatic political philosophy, which the Chinese
government now promotes in global forums. (7)
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Anti-formalism and the Preordained
Birth of Chinese Jurisprudence
SAMULI  SEPPÄNEN
ABSTRACT: This article describes attempts in Chinese legal scholarship to produce indigenised forms of jurisprudence. These attempts are
partly animated by an ethos of anti-formalism and the assumption that Chinese legal thought and the Chinese approach to adjudication are
more flexible and more responsive to social concerns than (Western) legal formalism. Interestingly, prominent currents of European and Ame-
rican jurisprudence have made use of similar anti-formalist arguments since the beginning of the twentieth century. The anti-formalist im-
pulse and the calls to indigenise Chinese jurisprudence are therefore best understood as performative strategies that support specific ideolo-
gical projects, such as the effort to legitimise China’s political status quo.
KEYWORDS: Chinese law, legal theory.
The legal theoretical move that characterises anti-formalist attempts to
indigenise Chinese jurisprudence has been an integral part of global legal
thought since the beginning of the twentieth century. Early-twentieth cen-
tury legal theorists in France (Geny 1919), Germany (Jhering 1913), Scan-
dinavia (Lundstedt 1956), the United States (Pound 1917), and many other
Western and non-Western countries called for a new mode of jurisprudence
that would be better suited to local social conditions than the received,
supposedly formalist mode of legal thought. Anti-formalist jurisprudence
supported the construction of welfare-state institutions and other inter-
ventionist state policies that had been resisted through formalist legal ar-
guments (Kennedy 2003). As is the case with China today, twentieth century
anti-formalism also had a vaguely nationalistic flair. Its advocates perceived
their own legal systems to be more responsive to social concerns than the
supposedly formalist legal systems of foreign countries (Kennedy 2003).
The anti-formalist attempt to indigenise Chinese jurisprudence therefore
follows tried and tested global models. Prominent attempts to articulate
forms of Chinese legal thought, such as the CCP’s textbook on the socialist
rule of law conception (8) and scholarly examinations of anti-formalist re-
search paradigms (Jiang 2003: 5; Zhu 2004: 7), have been made with explicit
reference to the above-described early-twentieth century legal thought.
Against this background, it seems unlikely that the mere aspiration to es-
tablish a socially responsive, anti-formalist form of jurisprudence would pro-
duce “original theories based on China’s practical conditions,” as requested
by the Chinese leadership. (9) Instead of reforming jurisprudence in China or
anywhere else, a self-proclaimed reformist may well end up repeating old
clichés about the importance of localised, socially responsive jurisprudence.
This is not a problem for liberal-leaning Chinese legal scholars, who see no
need for an indigenised Chinese jurisprudence (Xu 2016). However, the fail-
ure to provide indigenised legal theoretical insights is problematic for those
CCP ideologues and scholars who are concerned about the appeal of liberal
legal and political thought in China. (10)
This article describes Chinese legal scholars’ attempts and frustrations in
developing Chinese forms of jurisprudence, legal theory, and legal thought
through anti-formalism. As mentioned above, other attempts at developing
indigenous Chinese legal thought have been launched from Confucian tra-
ditionalism (Xia 2011) and neo-conservative (“New Leftist”) critical schol-
arship (Deng 2008; Jiang 2003). I have discussed these strands of scholarship
elsewhere (Seppänen 2014, 2016: 134-63). This article first describes anti-
formalist legal thought in a global context. It then proceeds to examine
anti-formalism in Chinese legal thought and in Chinese theories of adjudi-
cation, which seek to operationalise legal thought by providing theoretical
guidance for law application. This article finally discusses the possibility of
indigenising Chinese jurisprudence in the context of China’s ideologically
divided legal academia. Conclusions are in the final section.
Anti-formalism in global legal thought
“Legal formalism,” the bête noire of many theoretically ambitious legal
scholars, is a contested term. As is the case with labels such as “socialism”
and “liberalism,” legal formalism is sometimes used as a term of devotion.
Formalism stands for the assumption that legal rules are capable of restrict-
ing, and should restrict, decision-making. For a formalist, rules should restrict
conduct even when, and especially when, they do not seem to serve public
interests and their own presumed purposes (Schauer 1988: 510, 535). Rules
are rules because they prevent decision-makers from considering factors
that they would otherwise take into account. This is desirable because rules
make it difficult to decide cases according to screened-off considerations,
such as a person’s race, gender, ethnic background, or some other criteria
deemed undesirable by the enactors of the rule. As a social practice, for-
malism stands for “accountability, openness, and equality” (Koskenniemi
2001: 500). In a liberal democratic political system, a culture of formalism
also supports the separation of powers doctrine by restricting the judiciary’s
authority to interpret rule-like norms (Manning 1999: 691). Advocates of
formalism do not deny that decision-makers sometimes arrive at decisions
without regard to rules. Their argument is that judicial behaviour is not, and
should not be, characterised by a rule-breaking attitude (Schauer 1988:
530). A supporter of formalism may further point out that the virtues of
formalism are uncontroversial in the legal community, and that it makes
little sense to oppose formalism as a general category of legal theory or
legal thought (Schauer 1988: 548; Stone 2002: 172). Indeed, as argued
below, prominent Chinese critiques of formalism do not dispense with its
underlying presupposition that legal rules should restrict decision-making
powers. (11)
Despite its potential virtues, legal formalism is more commonly used as a
derogatory label rather than a term of devotion (Schauer 1988: 510; Stone
2002: 166). Legal formalism was first identified as an object of scholarly
critique by American, French, German, and Scandinavian sociological jurists
at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Kennedy 2006: 40).
According to sociological jurists, legal formalists had failed to appreciate
(either unwittingly or cynically) the actual policy considerations involved
in a legal matter. This was harmful for the public good, since the “law-in-
books,” as opposed to “law-in-action,” regularly failed to provide sound so-
lutions for concrete social problems (Pound 1910). Another prominent form
of criticism against legal formalism, particularly in the United States and
Scandinavia, was presented by the so-called legal realist movement, which
proposed to study legal institutions through empirical methods instead of
textual analysis of formal law (Llewellyn 1930). 
Both schools of thought—sociological jurisprudence (Pound 1910) and
legal realism (Llewellyn 1930)—sought to demonstrate that the rule-like
quality of law had been exaggerated in legal scholarship and that legal rules
were “not the most useful center of reference for discussion” (Llewellyn
1930: 431). Much of this critique focused on a specific method of legal jus-
tification, which may be called textual formalism (Kennedy 2001: 8634).
This technique, the critics argued, purported to decide cases by examining
the literal meaning of a rule and applying this meaning to a given fact pat-
tern. The textually formalist method allegedly denied or downplayed the
role of choice in adjudication, and consequently ignored (or pretended to
ignore) relevant contextual considerations (Kennedy 2001: 8634). An oft-
cited example is the notorious Gilded Age decision, Lochner v. New York, (12)
decided in 1905 (Schauer 1988: 511). In this decision, the United States
Supreme Court held that federal restrictions on working hours were an un-
constitutional limitation of the contractual freedom of American labour-
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ers. (13) To sociological jurists and legal realists (who included the dissenting
judge in Lochner and the founder of American legal realism, Oliver Wendell
Holmes), this form of legal reasoning was both disingenuous and uncon-
vincing. No legal necessity, it was argued, required the Supreme Court to
hold federal working time laws unconstitutional. “General propositions do
not decide concrete cases,” Holmes wrote in his famous dissent. (14) In the
critics’ view, the Supreme Court had sought to advance laissez-faire eco-
nomic policies behind the veil of formalist legal reasoning (Pound 1908:
615-6). (15)
In the United States and globally, sociological jurisprudence and legal re-
alism became the legal means for attacking the political and economic sys-
tem of the early twentieth century and its legal edifice (Horwitz 1992: 152).
Contractual obligations and property rights, it was argued, should be deter-
mined in response to whatever concrete social ends and policies the legis-
lature sought to achieve rather than through textual analysis of formal law
(Holmes 1897: 465-6; Pound 1908: 221-2). This argument supported pro-
gressive lawyers’ project to defend welfare state institutions and state in-
terventions against conservative laissez-faire policies, and it proved effective
from Egypt (Shalakany 2001: 162) to Sweden (Malminen 2007: 80-1) and
the United States (Horwitz 1992: 194).
The influence of sociological jurisprudence was also felt in China during
the same period. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People treated private
property rights as means to promote the common livelihood rather than
as formal individual entitlements. Private land rights, for instance, could be
taxed or acquired by the government as the public good required (Sun 1927:
433). It says much about the global reach of sociological jurisprudence that
Roscoe Pound, the Harvard Law School dean and the foremost figure in
American sociological jurisprudence, served as a legal adviser to the Kuom-
intang in the 1930s and 40s. In this role, Pound purported to promote legal
institutions that were based on “Chinese knowledge of Chinese conditions”
(Kroncke: 211). (16)
In retrospect, much of the success of legal realism and sociological ju-
risprudence can be explained by its irreverent style, which suited the icon-
oclastic zeitgeist of the early twentieth century (Ackerman 1974: 125). Legal
realists, in particular, promised a radical break from the tired conventions
of the nineteenth century. With the wisdom of hindsight, sociological and
legal realist critics of legal formalism can be seen to have overstated their
case. The object of the sociological and realist critique, “legal formalism,”
may have been a strawman that was set up for an “effortless assault on un-
defended positions” (Stone 2002: 170). The supposedly formalist decision
in Lochner v. New York, for instance, did in fact consider the social conse-
quences of contractual freedom. (17) By presenting a one-sided image of the
court’s reasoning in Lochner and other supposedly formalist decisions, so-
ciological jurists and legal realists were able to position themselves as the
avant-garde of legal thought and support progressive legislation as scien-
tifically advanced legal institutions rather than as subjective political pref-
erences. This argumentative strategy lost much of its global appeal in the
1960s and 70s, as legal scholars came to believe that the examination of
social realities was insufficient for deciding matters of justice. In the latter
part of the twentieth century, global legal thought turned towards proce-
dural justice, fundamental rights, universal human rights, and constitution-
alism (Kennedy 2003).
A more recent source of criticism against “formalism” in global legal
thought originates in the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which has
been influential in Chinese New Leftist scholarship (Wang 2006: 173). Dun-
can Kennedy (1976), the founding father of the CLS movement, argues that
the never-ending pull between formal rules and substantive standards
makes it impossible to rely exclusively on either formalist legal rules or so-
ciologically determined policies (Kennedy 1976). For every formalist argu-
ment there exists an anti-formalist argument, and vice versa. Formalism in
global legal scholarship has also been attacked through legal pragmatism,
a relatively small legal theoretical denomination that has nonetheless been
embraced by prominent Chinese sociological jurists (Zhu 2016: 123). Prag-
matism defines itself in opposition to legal formalism, which it takes to be
a “slave of the past” (Posner 1996: 8). A pragmatist judge will not be con-
fined to ensuring the consistency of past interpretations of formal rules
(Posner 1996: 4). Instead, the judge looks for the “best” solution given the
facts of a specific case (Posner 1996: 16; Zhu 2016: 123). While pragmatists
reject formalism as the sole adjudicative technique, the analysis of the
meaning of formal rules is part of the pragmatist decision-making process.
Stability in law is “a genuine public good” (Posner 1996: 7), but in order to
make the “best” decision, a judge will have to consider all relevant issues,
and not just the meaning of formal legal texts.
Anti-formalism in Chinese legal thought
Chinese critiques on legal formalism build on the above-described global
scholarship (Jiang 2010; Wang 2016; Zhu 2004). “Legal formalism” translates
into Chinese as falüxingshizhuyi 法律形式主义, a term that can carry a pos-
itive or a negative connotation, just like the English language term “legal
formalism.” In addition to falüxingshizhuyi, the object of Chinese anti-for-
malist critique may also be described through the concept of fatiaozhuyi
法条主义. This is a negatively charged term, and best translated into English
as “legal dogmatism.” (18) As is the case with “legal formalism,” fatiaozhuyi
may be defined as “an attempt to build a regime or system of rules (…)
that is relatively complete, logically self-consistent, convenient for commu-
nication and operationally valid” (Deng 2014: 216). (19) The two terms, (falü)
xingshizhuyi and fatiaozhuyi, can be used interchangeably in order to crit-
icise excessively formalist decision-making. For instance, a textbook on the
socialist rule of law conception published by the Central Political and Legal
Committee of the CCP defines the legal thought opposed by American legal
realists as fatiaozhuyi, while also warning party cadres against the dangers
of xingshizhuyi. (20)
Anti-formalism takes various forms in Chinese legal thought. First, anti-
formalism is an approach (or part of an approach) to legal theory. In this
sense, anti-formalism is meant to expose the shortcomings of mainstream
formalist legal thought and point the way to a new, socially responsive ju-
risprudence. The most influential (although controversial) anti-formalist cri-
tique of China’s mainstream jurisprudence has been put forth by Professor
Zhu Suli, the former dean of Peking University School of Law. Zhu Suli was
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instrumental in introducing sociological jurisprudence and social scientific
research methods into China in the 1990s. In Zhu’s view, Chinese jurispru-
dence had “paid attention only to research on legal texts, but not to (…)
informal systems,” which informed how law actually operated in Chinese
society (Zhu 2016: 49). Zhu’s scholarship had the irreverent air of American
Legal Realism, and it was experienced as provocative by liberal-minded and
mainstream Chinese legal scholars, who objected to it vehemently (Xu
2002). The anti-formalist argument implied that scholars who conducted
doctrinal analyses of formal law, including its rights protections, were both
socially out-of-touch and politically naive. This was an ideologically explo-
sive argument, since Zhu’s scholarship was associated with the neo-con-
servative defence of China’s political status quo (Upham 2005). 
As was the case with Western sociological jurisprudence and legal realism,
the aim of Chinese sociological jurisprudence is not the wholesale disavowal
of rule-based legal governance, which is of central importance to the CCP. (21)
Instead, Chinese sociological jurists aim to identify legal and social institu-
tions (whether formal or informal) that best suit China’s “needs,” however
these needs may be defined. This project relies on the legal realist distinction
between “law-in-books” and “law-in-action,” and it presumes that some as-
pects of the Chinese “law-in-books” are potentially counterproductive for
realising the Party’s and the people’s interests. Hence, Zhu maintains that
“formal legal knowledge [has] quite a few conflicts with customs that are
rather stable and prevalent in Chinese society” (Zhu 2016: xii). In order to
account for useful social institutions and practices, Chinese legal scholars
“need to look for native resources from all kinds of informal legal systems”
(Zhu 2016: xiv). Chinese anti-formalism thus provides a political agenda
and a research agenda. Zhu Suli, the paterfamilias of Chinese sociological
jurisprudence, has conducted a number of influential sociological studies in
the Chinese countryside, among other things, describing the pragmatic ap-
proach to adjudication in basic-level people’s courts (Zhu 2016). In the
1990s and the 2000s, Zhu’s disciples applied anti-formalist critique to var-
ious fields of law. Professor Jiang Shigong’s work on informal, “unwritten”
constitutional law is a prominent example of this genre of legal scholarship
(Jiang 2010, 2014). 
Second, anti-formalism in China exists as a legal theoretical argumentative
strategy. Much like the sociological and realist critique of the Lochner de-
cision, Chinese anti-formalism sets up a politically disagreeable viewpoint
as a “formalist” position and then repudiates this viewpoint through a the-
oretically privileged anti-formalist position. In this (as such controversial)
argumentative strategy, formalism stands for a bookish, socially out-of-
touch approach to law, whereas the preferred, supposedly more progressive
anti-formalist approach allows jurists to discover the actual “reality” of a
legal issue. This argumentative strategy can be observed, for instance, in
Jiang Shigong’s discussion on the Communist Party’s leadership role in Hong
Kong, where Jiang was posted as a researcher in the central Chinese gov-
ernment’s liaison office in the 2000s. Jiang first discusses the legal formalist
understanding of the CCP’s role in Hong Kong. “[F]rom the perspective of
legal formalism,” Jiang explains, “one has to distinguish in the Constitution
between what belongs to ‘one country,’ which would apply also to Hong
Kong, and what belongs to the ‘socialist system,’ which would not apply to
Hong Kong” (Jiang 2010: 38). In Jiang’s view such a formalist understanding
of the role of the CCP in Hong Kong would run into conceptual difficulties.
“[S]ince ‘one country’ is the prerequisite for ‘two systems,’ and this ‘one
country’ is obviously a socialist one, how can we formally separate ‘country’
and ‘socialism’ in China’s Constitution?” (Jiang 2010: 38). Jiang argues that
it is necessary to “break away from legal formalism,” “to step down from
the clouds of metaphysics,” and to understand constitutional questions
against “China’s political reality, history, and cultural traditions” (Jiang 2010:
38, 42). Jiang cites Deng Xiaoping as an authority for the realistic view of
the Communist Party’s role in Hong Kong. Deng believed that Hong Kong
should not exercise autonomy through a legislature-led model, but instead
be governed by “patriotic” chief executives. Relying on this statement, Jiang
contends that “the primary fundamental law in the Basic Law is the rule of
patriots in Hong Kong,” which is effected by the “leadership of the party”
(Jiang 2010: 40). Ergo, the CCP should play a leading role in Hong Kong. 
Third, Chinese anti-formalism constitutes an ideological strategy that le-
gitimises China’s state-sanctioned political ideology and the Communist
Party’s approach to the rule of law. Anti-formalist arguments seek to
demonstrate that political factors belong inevitably to adjudication and
that, as a consequence, the Communist Party’s supervision of the judiciary
is a legitimate means to bring such political factors into the application of
law. The aforementioned CCP textbook on the socialist rule of law concep-
tion explains, with reference to American sociological jurists and legal real-
ists, that in the West “there has never existed a judiciary that was truly
independent from politics.” (22) The lesson is that “the political has always
maintained its control and influence over the judiciary.” (23) The CCP’s ideo-
logical project is supported by insights from Sinified Marxism. A university-
level textbook on jurisprudence that is part of the national core curriculum
recognised by the Chinese Ministry of Education contends that Marxism is
“the most advanced and scientific legal theoretical framework in the history
of mankind” (Zhang 2011: 25). As is the case with sociological and realist
jurisprudence, Marxist jurisprudence is based on the study of “practice” (shi-
jian 实践) rather than bourgeois abstractions (Zhang 2011: 21, 28). Such
statements not only provide intellectual justifications for accepting China’s
political realities, but also send a political message about the undesired na-
ture of Western liberal legal and political thought in China. 
Fourth, Chinese anti-formalism sometimes associates legal formalism with
foreign countries and with the “West” in particular, thereby paving the way
for the critique of Western-inspired liberal reforms in China. Professor Deng
Zhenglai, a social theorist who taught at Fudan University before his passing
in 2013, argued in a seminal book that Chinese “legal dogmatism” had been
derived from continental Europe (and from Japan and Taiwan, which had
been influenced by European law) (Deng 2008: 65). In Deng’s view, Chinese
law reformers had received Western legal ideals uncritically, turning them
into the moral criteria against which Chinese law and legal development
were evaluated (Deng 2008: 108-9). Other Chinese scholars have raised
similar concerns. Professor Jiang Shigong notes that “the state of Chinese
legal scholarship has been especially preoccupied with legal formalism in
order to quickly adapt to international standards” (Jiang 2014: 1999).
The above-described anti-formalist arguments were particularly influential
in the 1990s and early 2000s, when most Chinese legal scholarship focused
on doctrinal research, as had been true of Western jurisprudence a century
earlier. Although the anti-formalist critique did not become the mainstream
position in China (Zhu 2001), it remains an important talking point in con-
temporary Chinese legal scholarship, where it maintains some of its original
iconoclastic nature. In a recent debate on the possibility of developing a
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specifically Chinese form of jurisprudence, Wang Ruolei, an associate pro-
fessor at the Central Party School, made use of a decidedly legal realist strat-
egy to discredit the received mode of Chinese jurisprudence. Wang mocked
the circular definitions of the “old generation of jurists,” who viewed “the
rule of law as democracy, constitutionalism, and human rights” and “democ-
racy as the rule of law, constitutionalism, and human rights” (Wang 2016:
90). Instead of getting tangled up in such conceptual fallacies, Wang advo-
cated the theoretically well-informed study of “China’s contemporary real-
ities” (Wang 2016: 89).
Anti-formalism in Chinese theories of
adjudication
Perhaps the most practical form of Chinese anti-formalism concerns the
Party’s guidance to judges and other law enforcement officials. To be sure,
anti-formalist legal theory, as it is developed in legal scholarship and in Party
textbooks, does not translate directly into legal practice. Instead, anti-for-
malist legal theory provides an ideological justification (philosophical ther-
apy, as it were) for decision-making in courts (Luban 1996: 57-8).
Anti-formalist language also sends a message about the undesirability of
autonomous legal reasoning—the argument is that politics cannot be sep-
arated from law— (24) although judicial autonomy and anti-formalism are
not mutually exclusive concepts. The afore-mentioned CCP textbook on the
socialist rule of law conception states that “[l]aw enforcement must (…)
resolutely prevent and overcome formalism” (xingshizhuyi 形式主义). (25)
The textbook does not spell out what overcoming formalism in law enforce-
ment entails. It does, however, introduce an anti-formalist concept to law
enforcement: the requirement to “serve the overall circumstances” (fuwu
daju 服务大局). On the highest level of abstraction, “overall circumstances”
are equivalent to the “fundamental interests of the Party and the state.” (26)
To serve the “overall circumstances” is to fight against crime and to promote
social justice, social harmony, and stability. It is to adhere to Marxism, Deng
Xiaoping Thought, the “Three Represents” theory and all the other theoret-
ical concepts advocated by the Party. To serve the overall circumstances is
also to protect the Party’s efforts in economic, political, cultural, and soci-
etal construction, and to safeguard national security—and many other
things. (27)
The concept of “overall circumstances” can be seen to perform an anti-
formalist role in the Party’s approach to law application and law enforce-
ment. The concept implies that the literal meaning of a legal rule is
insufficient for reaching an appropriate decision in an individual case. In-
stead of merely relying on the meaning-based interpretation of a legal rule,
law enforcement officials should consider the “overall circumstances” re-
lating to the case. This message is strengthened by the textbook’s critique
of “legal dogmatism” (fatiaozhuyi 法条主义), which is made with direct ref-
erence to American sociological jurisprudence and legal realism, as men-
tioned above. (28) The textbook cites approvingly the views of Benjamin
Cardozo (1870-1938), one of the most prominent American jurists and a
Supreme Court Justice. Cardozo (1921: 112) argued that adjudication must
weight “logic, and history, and custom, and utility” against “the comparative
importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted
or impaired.” (29) Following Cardozo, “overall circumstances” can be seen to
stand for all socialist desiderata that should be considered in adjudication.
However, the Party’s views on adjudication are far from unambiguous,
even by the elusive standards of global sociological jurisprudence and legal
realism. While the textbook instructs Party cadres to “resolutely (…) over-
come formalism,” (30) it also explicitly embraces a “formal conception” 
(xingshi yiyi 形式意义) of the law. The textbook urges Party cadres to perfect
China’s socialist legal system “in the formal sense” by ensuring the com-
pleteness of the legal system, the well-regulated and systematic nature of
legal regulations, and the internal coherence of these regulations. (31) The
textbook also states that it is “not possible to ‘serve’ the overall conditions
by violating laws and regulations.” (32) As such, the simultaneous critique of
formalism and the endorsement of formal law can be coherent. The bad
kind of formalism (xingshizhuyi 形式主义) in the textbook may well refer
to the authorities’ out-of-touch, out-of-tune (even “decadent”) attitude to
law enforcement, whereas the good kind of formalism may refer to the in-
ternal rationality and autonomy of the legal system. Law-in-books should
be as consistent as possible, but its application by judges and other officials
should respond to the “overall circumstances,” and in particular to the CCP’s
instructions. A commitment to formal law does not preclude the contention
that rules ought to be interpreted according to their purpose (Stone 2002:
196).
Nevertheless, the CCP’s ideological missives also enable less coherent in-
terpretations. The Party’s textbook on socialist law distinguishes between
“the overall circumstances” and the law, while at the same time insisting
that they are the same thing. “Handling matters strictly according to the
law” is to serve the overall circumstances, as is “resolutely opposing (…)
non-observance and lax implementation of laws.” (33) These statements sug-
gest that the meaning of formal law can be established without the need
to apply “overall circumstances” in legal reasoning. In other words, “overall
circumstances” may not be within the law in the same way as the “social
interests” outlined by Cardozo (1921: 112) are. Instead, they are the external
criteria against which the results of adjudication are measured. This impres-
sion is strengthened by the textbook’s distinction between the “legal effect”
(falü xiaoguo 法律效果 ) and the “political and social effect” (zhengzhi 
xiaoguo, shehui xiaoguo 政治效果, 社会效果) of a judicial decision. While
the legal effect of a decision is of “primary importance,” it is the “political
and social effect” that provides the “ultimate criterion” for law enforce-
ment. (34) Yet, the textbook also states that the constitution and the law are
the supreme sources of normativity, as are the Party’s cause and the Peo-
ple’s interests. (35)
Finally, conservative-minded Chinese legal scholars sometimes argue that
judges should discard formal law when this is the right thing to do. As al-
ready mentioned, Chinese sociological jurists do not advocate casting aside
all formal legal rules and processes. Zhu Suli, for instance, acknowledges
that judges should “even stick to procedural justice because the cost of sub-
stantive justice is too high” (Zhu 2016: 123). Nevertheless, Zhu also in-
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structs judges “to settle disputes well” after considering all possible solutions
and “not just (…) abide by their duties and implement extant legal rules”
(Zhu 2016: 123). In this regard, Zhu praises a figure in one of his empirical
studies: a rural judge who invents extra-legal remedies for the plaintiff for-
getting “certain basic rules” of formal law, such as the principle that there
should be no trial without a complaint (Zhu 2016: 124). 
The anti-formalist, pragmatic approach to adjudication conforms to the
consequentialist, wealth-maximising political ideology popular in China,
which presumes that formal rights and other legal institutions are ultimately
a means to an end (Zhu 2016: 123). Reflecting this perception, Communist
Party cadres sometimes suggest that formal law, even in its socialist form,
cannot be regarded as an autonomous field of knowledge. (36) Such anti-for-
malist statements should be seen in the context of equally prominent for-
malist statements about adjudication and law enforcement. As was pointed
out above, the CCP and Chinese leaders instruct Party cadres and govern-
ment officials to observe the laws strictly. There are readily understandable
reasons for such incoherent and even paradoxical uses of language in the
Party’s ideological texts. The CCP cannot instruct judges and other govern-
ment officials to discard formal law, because the Party governs China (at
least partly) through formal law. The Party wishes to restrict discretion in
decision-making, for instance, in order to ensure that local protectionism
does not subvert the Party’s economic goals. (37) As a consequence, and in
contrast to some Western anti-formalists (Posner 1996: 19), the Communist
Party does not seek to delegate boundless discretionary powers to judges.
The Party also regards formal equality, delivered through the people’s courts,
as a social good in its own right. (38) Emphasis on formal legal rules is a viable
governance strategy for the Party, because it is nearly invisible on the level
of formal law (Sapio 2010: 246-8). 
Nevertheless, formal law, even in its socialist form, allows potential legal
challenges against the Party’s power. The Party cannot allow judges to apply
law against “the fundamental interests of the Party and the State,” (39) lest
liberal-minded judges expand the scope of civil and political rights too far
into the political arena. As a consequence, the Party sends ambiguous mes-
sages about the role of formal law and the preferred methods of adjudica-
tion, making it apparent that the relationship between the Party and the
law should be seen as an unsettled and highly politicised matter (Seppänen
2016: 78). The ambiguous nature of the Party’s ideological statements on
formal law has been noted and criticised by mainstream Chinese legal schol-
ars, who seek to strengthen the autonomy of the Chinese judiciary (Tong
2011).
“Writing poems at the request of the
Emperor”
Finally, it may be asked whether the above-described uses of anti-formal-
ism constitute a specifically “Chinese” form of jurisprudence. As may be ex-
pected, the answer to this question depends on the ideological sensibilities
of an individual scholar. Chinese government ideologues and conservative-
minded scholars hope that the study of China’s social realities will produce
a Chinese form of jurisprudence that can compete with Western liberal legal
thought. (40) Scholars who are not interested in competing with Western lib-
eralism do not find it necessary or even possible to develop a uniquely Chi-
nese jurisprudence. Liberal-minded scholars, such as Professor Xu Aiguo at
Peking University, argue that any form of jurisprudence worth its name can-
not be based on a presumption of national unity. In Xu’s view, Chinese legal
scholars developing such theories “write poems at the request of the Em-
peror” (yingzhi 应制): “When officials speak of the necessity of developing
a market economy, [Chinese] jurists explain that market economy is an
economy under the rule of law (…); when the officials talk about Chinese
characteristics, [Chinese] jurists write about the rule of law and native re-
sources” (Xu 2016: 194).  
Even among party ideologues, theoretical ambitions are considerably low-
ered as one descends from the visionary heights of the Party’s leadership
to the grassroots level of junior law professors, who are tasked with invent-
ing original “Chinese” legal theoretical insights. At the highest level of ide-
ological leadership, President Xi Jinping is able to declare that “socialism
with Chinese characteristics (…) offers a new option for other countries and
nations,” (41) as well as to instruct scholars to develop “a system of philoso-
phy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics that incorporates the
country’s socialist practices.” (42) At the managerial level, politically attuned
senior professors and directors of academic institutions may still adhere to
the optimistic visions of the Party’s highest leadership. According to one
academic manager, “the CCP (…) has developed and perfected the theory
of the socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics.” (43) At the same
time, managers may also acknowledge problems in the implementation of
these visions. From the managerial perspective, it appears that “it has been
difficult for law as a discipline to meet the practical needs” of Chinese so-
ciety. (44) At the grassroots level, junior scholars see almost insurmountable
obstacles to developing a Chinese form of jurisprudence. Wang Ruolei of
the Central Party School argues that theoretical innovation in Chinese legal
academia is hampered by a poor academic environment. Whereas Western
legal scholarship progresses persistently due to “constant reflection, criti-
cism, and correction of previous hypotheses and conclusions,” in China “even
a good article fizzles out without anybody contesting, critiquing, or respond-
ing to it” (Wang 2016: 91). The lack of a discursive community has pre-
cluded the formation of uniquely Chinese methods, conclusions, and
paradigms of jurisprudence, which Wang believes to be essential for the for-
mation of an academic school of thought (Wang 2016: 91). 
Ironically, ideological repression also constrains Chinese legal scholars’ ef-
forts to develop a legal thought that could plausibly challenge liberal polit-
ical and legal thought. In particular, attempts to make sense of “China’s
realities” are obstructed by ideological taboos that prevent scholars from
addressing the merits of China’s governance system in frank and honest
terms. The same is true of legal theoretical innovation. Although Chinese
legal theorists allege that China’s Marxist jurisprudence proceeds from “the
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concrete to the abstract” (Zhang 2011: 28), in practice, Chinese legal schol-
ars are advised to progress in the opposite direction. In the aforementioned
meeting between President Xi and Chinese social scientists, a legal scholar
first instructed Chinese legal scholars to “fully understand the great signif-
icance of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and (only)
then to “implement it in the legal profession, promoting innovations in legal
theory.” (45) Similarly, the afore-mentioned textbook on jurisprudence de-
crees without much nuance that dialectical materialism must be at the core
of Chinese jurisprudence (Zhang 2011: 22). The anti-formalist impulse to
“seek truth from facts” is therefore tempered by the formalist nature of Chi-
nese socialism. (46)
Perhaps the most fundamental obstacle to developing a specifically Chi-
nese form of jurisprudence relates to the globalised nature of legal thought.
Whereas Chinese legal scholars have been instructed to develop original
“Chinese” legal theoretical insights, American and Scandinavian scholars
never set out to produce specifically “American” or “Scandinavian” ap-
proaches to law. Geographical labels were applied to American and Scandi-
navian scholarship only retrospectively, mostly for pedagogic reasons and
with many caveats. For all the talk about the creative agency of individual
scholars, Chinese legal academia is thoroughly globalised. In addition to ide-
ological divisions, Chinese legal scholars are divided according to the coun-
tries in which they received their graduate legal education. Scholarship
produced in the American post-realist genre by graduates from American
universities is seen to differ considerably from European-style legal schol-
arship, which focuses on the textual analysis of formal law. (47) And, needless
to say, dialectical materialism, the supposed core of Chinese jurisprudence,
originates in European social theory and continues to be defined with ref-
erence to Marxist classics even in its Sinicised form (Zhang 2011: 25-30).
Because of the global nature of legal academia, the persuasive force of
legal theoretical arguments is measured globally, even when they purport
to relate to a single country. Chinese legal scholars are well aware of this
fact. Zhu Suli (2004: 6), Xu Aiguo (2016: 171), and Wang Ruolei (2016: 86)
acknowledge that Chinese legal scholars will find it difficult to be persuaded
by local legal theoretical arguments if these arguments seem incapable of
standing up to global legal theoretical claims. In Wang’s opinion (2016: 90),
the first step towards the development of a Chinese form of jurisprudence
is not the examination of China’s social realities but the profound study of
H.L.A. Hart, the English legal philosopher.
Conclusion: Towards a Chinese
jurisprudence?
It is easy to understand why a number of Chinese legal scholars and gov-
ernment ideologues are drawn to anti-formalist legal thought. The key in-
sights of anti-formalism ring true in the Chinese context. If anywhere, surely
the legal realist insight that formal state law and legal institutions are po-
tentially out-of-step with social realities (Horwitz 1992: 188) is relevant in
contemporary China. It also seems plausible that the study of China’s de-
velopment experience will yield original legal theoretical insights. 
Nevertheless, anti-formalism offers no easy shortcuts for developing such
insights. Of course, one may apply a geographical label to Chinese jurispru-
dence (as this article has done), just as one may apply it to French and Es-
tonian jurisprudence. Anti-formalism certainly takes on a specific and
perhaps even unique form in China, where legal scholars have to adjust their
theoretical views to the country’s idiosyncratic ideological landscape. It is
also clear that the social effects of legal theoretical arguments are different
in China than elsewhere. Chinese anti-formalism supports the country’s au-
thoritarian political system and its experimental approach to economic reg-
ulation, whereas Western twentieth-century anti-formalism was part of the
progressive, social democratic movement. In this sense, Chinese legal sci-
ence is already indigenised, as is of course Finnish legal science and Swedish
legal science.
Nevertheless, an anti-formalist statement about the law, even when de-
scribed as a “Chinese” anti-formalist statement, is interpreted as an argu-
ment in the global langue of legal theory—a language that offers plenty of
counterarguments against any single anti-formalist theoretical statement
(Kennedy 2006b). Does it make sense to maintain that the predictability of
the legal process is just one consideration in an open-ended pragmatic cal-
culation of means and ends? How can concrete social realities be weighed
against justice goals? There is a lively, century-long debate about these
questions. Denying Chinese legal scholars access to this discourse—and
preventing them from being persuaded by arguments derived from it—
would be difficult in contemporary China.
Indeed, even the nationalistic tendency of Chinese anti-formalism reflects
its foreign linkages. As is the case with Chinese neo-conservative legal schol-
ars today, Western sociological jurists and legal realists tended to see legal
formalism as a foreign-born problem (Kennedy 2006b: 48-9). American so-
ciological jurists thought that the formal legal concepts of American law,
which were out of touch with social realities, were alien to American tradi-
tional society (Pound 1917: 211). When the United States government
began to export American legal thought to developing countries in the
1950s and 60s, the working assumption was that American jurisprudence
was more responsive to local social concerns than the formalist legal
thought in developing countries (Kennedy 2006a: 104-5). Deriding foreign-
ers for formalism has a long pedigree in global legal thought.
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